Tax policies to promote private charitable giving in DAC countries by David Roodman & Scott Standley
 
 
Working Paper Number 82 
January 2006 
  
Tax policies to promote private charitable  
giving in DAC countries  






Researchers have written hundreds of papers on the causes and consequences of official foreign aid, 
while paying almost no attention to private overseas giving, by individuals, universities, foundations, 
and corporations. Yet private giving is significant—some $15.5 billion/year, compared to more than 
$60 billion/year in public giving—and is in no small part an outcome of public policy. In most rich 
countries, tax deductions and credits lower the “price” of charity to donors. And governments with low 
tax revenue/GDP ratios leave more money in private pockets for private charity. To correct the near-
complete lack of information on this de facto aid policy, we survey officials of 21 donor nations on the 
use of tax incentives to promote private charity. From the results, we develop an index of the overall 
incentive for private charity, expressed as a percentage increase over the hypothetical giving level 
absent incentives. France’s tax code creates the largest price incentive while those of Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden offer none. Factoring in the income effect of the tax ratio, Australia, Ireland, Germany, 
and the United States move to the top, with combined price and income effects sufficient to double 
private giving. As a result, tax policy appears to have nearly doubled private overseas giving from 
donor countries in 2003, from a counterfactual $8.0 billion. Two-thirds of the $7.5 billion increase 
occurred in the United States. Of that, nearly 40% appears to be U.S. charity to Israel. According to 
21-country scatter plots, countries with lower church attendance and more faith in the national 
legislature have lower taxes (stronger income effect), but average levels of targeted tax incentives. 
Income (GDP/capita) does correlate with private overseas aid/capita, but also with public aid/capita, so 
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Public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of a society. The spirit of a 
people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare—all this and more is 
written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to the message here 
discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else. 
          —Joseph Schumpeter
2
 
The hardest thing in the world to understand is the income tax. 




Private charitable giving from rich countries to poor countries is an important component of 
foreign aid, broadly defined. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) based in the 22 donor countries that are members of DAC delivered over 
$15 billion worth of private aid in 2003,
3 more than official bilateral assistance from every 
individual DAC country except the United States.
4
 
Evidence also suggests that governments can influence the level of private giving from their 
citizens through tax policy (Feldstein and Taylor 1976; Clotfelter 1985; Schiff 1990; Greene and 
McClelland 2001; Brooks 2004; Gilbert 2005). Specifically, private giving is encouraged by a 
low tax ratio as a share of GDP—which leaves citizens more money to spend on charity—and by 
targeted tax incentives that lower the “price” of donations. Thus private giving to developing 
countries is partly an outcome of public policy. 
 
But while there is a rather exhaustive body of research on many other aspects of foreign aid, 
private charitable flows from rich countries to poor countries have received scant attention. 
Many studies have examined the tax treatment of charitable contributions, but most deal only 
with the impact of tax incentives in the United States and nearly all fail to differentiate between 
                                                 
1 David Roodman (droodman@cgdev.org) is a Research Fellow and Scott Standley (sstandley@cgdev.org) is a 
Research Assistant at the Center for Global Development. We thank William Cline and Todd Moss for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.  
2 Quote from Mulgan and Murray (1993), Reconnecting Taxation (London: Demos). 
3 OECD/DAC (2005a). The $15 billion figure sums net grants from NGOs to both Part I and Part II countries as 
defined by the OECD/DAC, which excludes official aid channeled through NGOs. The most recent available year 
with available data in each country is used (17 countries use 2003 data).  
4 Public assistance here refers to the combined bilateral Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and Overseas 
Assistance (OA) from 21 DAC countries in 2003. By definition, OA goes to “Part II” countries, which are former 
Eastern Bloc nations or countries that are relatively rich, such as Israel. OECD/DAC (2005a). 
  2international and domestic donations. Cross-country analyses of the impact of tax policy on 
giving for development, meanwhile, are virtually non-existent. In sum, tax policy, as it affects 
international private giving, is an important yet largely ignored aspect of aid policy.  
 
This paper presents the results of an attempt to narrow this gap in knowledge. Between 
November 2004 and March 2005 the Center for Global Development conducted a data-gathering 
exercise on DAC country tax policies. Through a survey of DAC country embassy and tax 
officials, we compiled comparable data on the use of tax incentives to promote private charitable 
giving across 21 DAC countries and used the data to estimate the contribution of tax policies to 
observed private donations to developing countries.
5  
 
Following this introduction, Section 2 gives an overview of the data landscape for private 
charitable giving. Section 3 describes the two main ways government tax policy can influence 
private decisions to give. Section 4 presents our data collection methodology and reviews key 
results. Section 5 estimates the impact of tax policies on giving among DAC countries. Section 6 
examines some suggestive relationships of federal tax policies with societal factors that influence 
the development of those policies and with actual giving levels. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Private charitable giving from DAC countries to the developing world 
 
Before considering specific tax policies that affect private giving, it is useful to develop a sense 
of the size of charitable flows. Available data on private charitable aid from rich country citizens 
to poor countries appear relatively low-quality, but even conservative estimates leave little doubt 
that the flow is substantial. 
 
A full accounting of the level of finance flowing from all rich countries has been limited to date 
by several factors. Tracking private donations in any country is inherently difficult. Each 
charitable donation is a private decision made by an individual, and no government can account 
for all the many private transactions that take place across a country and make up a nation’s total 
charitable giving. Tracking from the recipient side is also difficult given the number of private 
organizations that receive donations.  
 
Attempts to estimate total private giving generally use one of three data sources: tax returns, 
household surveys, or surveys of intermediary organizations that channel private donations. Each 
method has drawbacks and each can offer a different picture of total giving from a country. Tax 
return data almost certainly undercount total giving, as only those donations claimed for 
deductions or credits are included. In the United States, taxpayers must itemize to claim a 
charitable tax deduction, and most taxpayers would not benefit from itemizing. As a result, tax 
return data excludes any donations by non-itemizers as well as donations not claimed as 
deductions. Even if this flaw is not significant and available tax data give an accurate estimate of 
a nation’s total charitable giving, these data still say nothing about the ultimate destination of 
gifts. As long as a donation goes to a qualified charity, the use of the gift by the charity does not 
matter for tax reporting purposes, meaning that estimates of international charitable flows are not 
possible from tax data.  
 
                                                 
5 All DAC countries were surveyed except Luxembourg. 
  3Household surveys of giving help fill some of these gaps, but they too have limitations. While 
surveys can include questions to separate out the destination of giving to allow for estimates of 
international development assistance, they rely on the accuracy of self-reported data from 
respondents who are likely to exaggerate their amount of charity donated (Andreoni 2005; 
Institute for Philanthropy 2005; Independent Sector 2004). The use of different survey 
methodologies also limits the comparability of giving studies. Most available estimates calculate 
only giving in a single country and make no attempt to compare across countries. Government 
agencies and nonprofits from individual DAC countries estimate the amount of charity flowing 
from their borders, but each uses its own definition of “charitable giving” as well as unique 
methodologies to calculate their estimates. What is considered charitable giving in one country 
may not necessarily count in others. These definitional problems are even more problematic for 
estimating international flows. Generally, studies divide gifts by sector and include 
“international” donations as one possible outlet of charitable finance. Since nearly all estimates 
cover only a single donor country, attempts to compare across countries involve the combination 
of different methodologies and different meanings of “international development” donations. 
The nature of estimating private charity makes it difficult to obtain consensus estimates of giving 
even for a single country. For example, recent estimates of U.S. giving to developing countries 
range from $1 billion to $19 billion (See Section 2.2).  
 
Private giving can also be estimated by surveying intermediary organizations that send money 
overseas, the main channel by which private charity is delivered to poor countries. Most 
intermediaries keep detailed financial records of their operating expenses and sources of 
financial support. There are also a limited number of groups making overseas grants, certainly 
far fewer than individual households donating money. This means that, in practical terms, 
surveying organizations is easier and perhaps more accurate than surveying households. Of 
course, surveys cannot cover all of the organizations making overseas grants. But in most 
countries a small number of large organizations are probably responsible for most of the total 
assistance, making it possible to survey a select number of groups to come up with an estimate of 
giving that accounts for most private charity flowing to poor countries.  
 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) collects the most comprehensive cross-country 
estimates of private giving to developing countries. DAC data counts giving channeled through 
NGOs based in sending countries, including donations by individuals and foundations but 
leaving out official aid channeled through NGOs. The DAC collects these data from donor-
country governments, meaning that each government chooses the methodology for estimating the 
assistance reported to the DAC. For example, DAC data for the United States comes from 
balance of payments information and surveys of organizations that send money overseas 
compiled by the government.  
 
Even these data, however, are flawed and unlikely fully representative of the true value of 
private giving to poor countries. Despite attempts for a standardized collection process, DAC 
data are still not collected on a comparable basis in each country. While the dataset gives the 
impression of uniform comparability, member countries remain responsible for the data and 
differences in reporting charitable giving from one country to another compromise the accuracy 
of the DAC database. Most likely, these reporting defects cause the DAC data to undercount 
total giving. Despite these flaws, the DAC data reports each donor-country’s best attempt to 
  4estimate the amount of NGO assistance flowing from their borders. This and the difficulty in 
finding comparable alternative data across countries makes the DAC the most useful source for 
rough estimates of charitable giving from rich countries to poor countries.   
 
2.1.  Grants from DAC country NGOs 
 
According to the DAC, NGOs based in the 22 DAC countries delivered $15.5 billion worth of 
private assistance in 2003.
6 The DAC line item “net grants by NGOs” sums expenditure by 
national NGOs working in development assistance and relief together with any additional 
contributions in kind made to developing countries, multilateral organizations (e.g., proceeds to 
UNICEF from Christmas card sales), or international NGOs. This category includes most 
overseas private charitable giving since most is channeled through development NGOs.
7 It is also 
believed that most foundation expenditure on development is included in the DAC data on NGO 
grants (OECD/DAC 2003). In order to avoid double counting of NGO activity financed by 
government contributions, the DAC also subtracts donor government grants or subsidies to 
national NGOs in its calculation.  
 
The $15.5 billion figure is the sum of net grants from NGOs in all DAC countries to both “Part 
I” and “Part II” countries. Data for 2003 is not available for all countries, so we use the most 
recent available year of data for each country (17 countries have 2003 data at this writing).
8 
According to the DAC, the list of Part I countries includes most economies typically categorized 
as “developing countries.” Nearly all of these Part I countries fall below the World Bank’s 
threshold for “high-income country” ($9,386 GNI per capita in 2003). Part II countries, 
meanwhile, are former Eastern Bloc nations or countries that are relatively rich, such as Israel. 
While there is no standard path to graduation, the DAC reviews the list every three years and a 
country with a per capita income falling above the World Bank high-income country threshold 
for three consecutive years normally graduates to Part II, though exceptions are made depending 
on DAC analysis of each country’s development and resource status.
9
 
Seventy percent of DAC private aid goes to Part I countries. The 22 DAC countries delivered 
around $11.1 billion to Part I countries and another $4.4 billion to the richer Part II countries in 
the most recent year with available data for each country (Table 1). This split is somewhat 
misleading, however, as most DAC countries give almost exclusively to the poorest recipients. 
The United States stands out as the one notable exception. In 2003 the United States gave $4.3 
billion to Part II countries (97% of total Part II flows), which U.S. government sources hint is 
mostly to Israel. Part II giving accounted for 40% of the U.S. total. The country with the next 
highest share of giving to Part II countries was Austria, at 15% ($13 million).
10
  
                                                 
6 OECD/DAC (2005a).   
7 See DAC Statistical Reporting Directives for full explanation. OECD/DAC (2000).  
8 There are four countries with data from a year other than 2003: Denmark (2001), France (1995), Norway (2002), 
and Spain (1998). 
9 See OECD/DAC (2005b), DAC List of Aid Recipients, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist. 
10 Germany gave $100 million to Part II countries in 2003 (10% of total German giving), the second highest level in 
the DAC. No other country gave more than $13 million. 
  5Table 1. DAC country NGO grants to developing countries (US$ million, most recent year)  
Country Year Part I Part II Total
Australia 2003 337 0 337
Austria 2003 71 13 84
Belgium 2003 165 0 165
Canada 2003 566 0 566
Denmark 2001 17 2 19
Finland 2003 13 1 14
France 1995 280 0 280
Germany 2003 1,008 100 1,108
Greece 2003 8 0 8
Ireland 2003 283 0 283
Italy 2003 27 0 28
Japan 2003 335 0 335
Luxembourg 2003 7 0 7
Netherlands 2003 379 0 379
New Zealand 2003 18 0 18
Norway 2002 452 0 452
Portugal 2003 4 0 4
Spain 1998 133 0 133
Sweden 2003 23 0 23
Switzerland 2003 280 11 292
United Kingdom 2003 389 5 394
United States 2003 6,326 4,254 10,580
Total 11,122 4,387 15,509  
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a). 
 
American citizens give the most in absolute terms; American NGOs delivered $10.6 billion in 
grants to developing countries in 2003. Germany was next with $1.1 billion. At the bottom of the 
rankings, Portuguese citizens gave $4 million and Greeks gave $8 million, according to the data 
their governments reported to DAC.  
 
The picture changes when looking at giving per person (Table 2). In 2003, Americans gave $37 
per person, less than Norway
11, Ireland and Switzerland. Italy joins Greece and Portugal at the 
bottom; all three countries gave less than $1 per person during 2003.  
  
                                                 
11 Norway’s giving figure is for 2002. 
  6Table 2. DAC country NGO grants to Part I and Part II countries, per capita and per unit 


























United Kingdom $6.64 0.02%
United States $36.38 0.10%  
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a); World Bank (2005). 
 
These data, as mentioned earlier, probably undercount actual giving. But even using the 
conservative DAC figures, private charity from rich country citizens is clearly a significant 
source of finance for developing countries. According to the DAC estimates, if charitable 
contributions were a country, as it were, they would be the world’s second-largest donor. Table 3 
gives bilateral Net Aid Transfers in 2003 of both Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Overseas Assistance (OA) by the 22 DAC countries. Net Aid Transfers (NAT) is a modified 
version of the DAC ODA/OA variable, which more sharply measures actual transfers of 
resources to receiving countries.
12 ODA counts all assistance delivered to Part I countries while 
OA counts assistance to Part II countries. Though substantially smaller than total government 
foreign aid, private finance flowing into developing countries can be an important complement to 







                                                 
12 In contrast, ODA is a capital flow concept, which does not net out interest received. See Roodman (2005b) for a 
full explanation of the calculation of net transfers. 
  7Table 3. Private giving versus Net Aid Transfers to developing countries (US$ million, 
2003)  
Rank Country Part I (ODA) Part II (OA) Total
1 United States 14,448 1,341 15,789
2 Total DAC private giving
1 11,122 4,387 15,509
3 United Kingdom 6,156 72 6,228
4 Japan 6,014 -337 5,676
5 Germany 5,154 368 5,522
6 France 3,902 1,231 5,133
7 Netherlands 3,680 153 3,833
8 Sweden 2,235 105 2,341
9 Norway 2,020 48 2,068
10 Canada 1,933 44 1,978
11 Denmark 1,740 115 1,855
12 Italy 1,834 15 1,850
13 Spain 1,842 5 1,847
14 Switzerland 1,262 66 1,329
15 Australia 1,212 2 1,214
16 Belgium 1,098 29 1,127
17 Finland 558 40 598
18 Austria 464 80 544
19 Ireland 504 1 505
20 Greece 362 21 383
21 Portugal 312 0 313
22 Luxembourg 194 41




1 All private giving data from 2003 except: Denmark (2001), France (1995), Norway (2002), and Spain (1998). 
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a); Roodman (2005b). 
  
2.2.  Alternative estimates of charitable giving to developing countries 
 
A large collection of studies has estimated giving in certain countries. Many of these national 
estimates differ dramatically with the DAC data. For example, some estimates of U.K charitable 
giving are much higher than those provided to the DAC. A study co-sponsored by the Charities 
Aid Foundation (CAF) and the National Council of Voluntary Organizations (NCVO)—an 
umbrella body for the voluntary sector—found that U.K. giving to “overseas relief” in 2004 
comprised 8% of total charitable giving. This comes to £656 million ($1.2 billion USD),
13 nearly 
three times the DAC number. These data come from surveys of private donors, so they do not 
include official aid channeled through NGOs.  
 
Individual giving estimates are not, however, uniformly higher than DAC figures.
14 In Australia, 
charity research organization Givewell estimated that in 2001 Australians donated 1.8 billion 
AUD ($1.3 billion USD)—nearly the same amount as the DAC. Of this total, $718 million AUD 
($526 million USD) were claimed as tax deductions.
15 Canada’s National Survey of Giving, 
                                                 
13 CAF and NCVO (2005).  
14 There are studies of giving for many DAC countries. Some other examples include “Charitable Giving and 
Volunteering in the Republic of Ireland,” National College of Ireland; and “Giving in the Netherlands,” Center for 
the Study of Philanthropy and Volunteering, 2001.  
15 See “Giving Statistics at a Glance,” www.givewell.com.au.  
  8Volunteering and Participating (NSGVP) found that 3% of Canadian private donations went to 
“international” organizations in 2000.
16 This comes to $147 million CAD ($124 million USD), 
only one-third the DAC estimate. The Canadian survey uses the International Classification of 
Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) developed by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit 
Sector Project to code recipient organizations. The ICNPO system groups organizations into 12 
major activity groups. The “international” category includes “organizations promoting cultural 
understanding between peoples of various countries and historical backgrounds, as well as those 
providing emergency relief and promoting development and welfare abroad.”
17  
 
Estimates of U.S. giving to developing countries range widely, though some common patterns 
emerge from the data. Americans as a group give around 2% of their income annually, a level 
that has hardly changed over the last 30 years.
18 According to the American Association of Fund-
Raising Counsel’s (AAFRC’s) Giving USA, the share of donated income in 1974 was 1.8% and 
in 1995 it was 1.9%. Nearly every study also finds that only a very small share of total American 
charity goes to international recipients. Estimates between 1993 and 2005 routinely calculate 
international giving at around 2% of total U.S. charity. Most recently, Giving USA  2004 
estimates that 2% of American donations went to international charities in 2003—the smallest 
share out of 10 possible sectors.
19  
 
One estimate of American giving comes from IRS tax return data. According to these data 
Americans claimed $139 billion worth of charitable deductions in 2001 (the most recent year 
with available public data). This probably undercounts total giving since IRS data include only 
donations claimed by those that itemize their tax returns. The AAFRC estimates that Americans 
gave $159 billion in 2001, $20 billion more than the IRS total. This gap might be explained by 
donations of non-itemizers (the Giving USA figure includes both IRS data on charitable 
deductions and estimates of giving by non-itemizers). This difference is relatively small, 
however, and suggests that IRS deduction data captures most American giving. In an earlier 
study the Independent Sector (2003) finds that itemizers give significantly more than non-
itemizers. But a small portion of this assistance goes to developing countries. According to 
Giving USA 2004, Americans gave $4.8 billion internationally in 2003—less than half the DAC 
estimate of $10 billion.
20
 
A much higher calculation of U.S. private giving comes from Adelman, Norris, and Weicher 
(2005) of the Hudson Institute. According to this widely publicized estimate,
21 total U.S. private 
                                                 
16 Lasby and McIver (2004). 
17 Salamon and Anheier (1996). 
18 See Independent Sector (2004), AAFRC (2004), and Clotfelter (1997).  
19 Samples of studies of other DAC countries find that international giving is typically a higher share of total giving 
than in the United States and Canada. Available estimates are that it comprises 10% in the United Kingdom and 
18% in the Netherlands.  See CAF and NCVO (2005) and Burger and Decker (2001). 
20 AAFRC (2005). Contributions made in 2004 for relief after the December tsunami are a very small portion of the 
estimated total, less than one-half of 1 percent. Much of the tsunami relief giving will appear in 2005, and, at 
between $1.5 billion and $2.5 billion, tsunami relief contributions likely will be a low percentage of the total 
estimated charitable contributions for that year, but might lead to an increase in total international donations. 
21 This and prior estimates by the authors have been quoted widely in the press and publicly adopted by USAID in, 
for example, the USAID report Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and 
Opportunity.  USAID Administrator Andrew S. Natsios has also referred to these figures in public remarks (e.g., 
  9assistance to developing countries amounted to $22 billion in 2003.
22 This figure includes $8 
billion from religious organizations, $3 billion from foundations, $3 billion from corporations, 
$2 billion from colleges and universities, $3 billion in nonprofits, and $3 billion in volunteer 
time.  
 
This work illustrates the difficulty in obtaining consistent estimates across countries due to 
differing methodologies. There is very little documentation of the sources for the Adelman et al. 
figures and the underlying assumptions are not made clear. One of the biggest problems concerns 
the issue of double-counting, which the DAC attempts to handle by netting out government 
grants to NGOs. It is not clear, however, that the Adelman et al. calculation addresses this 
problem. For example, the authors’ calculation includes estimates of giving from nonprofits 
taken from individual NGO financial statements, but much of the operating budgets of American 
NGOs come from the U.S. federal government. CARE, one of the largest American development 
NGOs, receives 60% of its funding from the U.S. government. Catholic Relief Services, another 
large U.S. development NGO, receives 78% of its funding from the government.
23 And given 
these probable sources of overcounting, the Adelman et al. estimate is actually not so different 
from the DAC. Excluding the value of volunteer time—since we are measuring actual financial 
assistance—the authors estimate actual private assistance of $18.7 billion in 2003. Including both 
Part I and Part II countries, the DAC figure for 2003 is $10.6 billion.  
 
The difficulties are not unique to the United States. In Japan, Matsubara and Todoroki (2003) 
assert that there exist no adequate sources of data which can be used to make a direct comparison 
with the figures from Giving USA. Recent estimates by government and independent agencies 
range dramatically, from under $300 million to over $8 billion.
24  
  
On balance, while there is a real danger of overestimating private giving, the DAC figures appear 
conservative. As a result, so are the estimates we will make of the aggregate aid contribution of 
tax policy.  
 
3.  How tax policies affect private charitable giving 
 
Tax policy can influence the level of private charitable donations in two ways: (1) through 
targeted tax incentives that lower the “price” of giving; and (2) via lower taxes overall, which 
leave citizens and corporations with more after-tax income to give to charity. Targeted tax 
incentives, usually income tax deductions or credits, increase giving through a “price effect,” 
                                                                                                                                                             
during a speech at the Heritage Foundation on 1/7/03). Examples of recent press coverage include The New York 
Times (1/4/05), Seattle Post-Intelligencer (1/5/05) and Foreign Policy magazine (2004). 
22 The authors’ original estimate also includes remittances—money sent by migrants living in the U.S. back to their 
home country—as U.S. private assistance to developing countries. Remittances account for nearly two-thirds of their 
total assistance figure ($40 billion). Though important, remittances are clearly a different type of finance. The source 
is developing country migrants themselves rather than American citizens. Even the most inclusive estimate of what 
constitutes private charitable giving should not include remittances from developing-country migrants.   
23 See transcript of “U.S. Aid: Generous or Stingy? A Debate Between Carol Adelman, Hudson Institute and Steve 
Radelet, Center for Global Development,” January 13, 2005, http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/1.13.05-
us%20aid/0113aid_debatetrans1.pdf.  
24 According to Matsubara and Todoroki (2003), the data most frequently used in Japan to estimate total giving are 
contributions deducted from taxes published by the National Tax Agency. 
  10where a dollar of forgone after-tax income funds more than a dollar of charity. For deductions, 
the “price effect” reduces the price of a gift by the marginal tax rate. Lower average taxes, 
meanwhile, increase private charitable giving through an “income effect,” where individuals and 
corporations have more after-tax income to spend on charitable donations. 
 
3.1.  “Price effect” of tax incentives 
 
Feldstein and Taylor (1976) find that the tax treatment of charitable contributions substantially 
influences the volume of donations in the United States. Clotfelter (1985) concludes that while 
taxes are not the most important determinant of individual contributions, both charitable 
deductions and changes in marginal tax rates are significant factors in determining the size and 
distribution of charitable giving.
25 Schiff (1990) similarly stresses that government fiscal policy 
can have an impact on charitable giving through both incentives and changes in tax rates.  
 
There are three main tax bases that are modified to create incentives for giving: (1) income; (2) 
capital gains; and (3) estate bequests.
  Sub-national governments also enact their own tax 
incentives to encourage giving. For example, in the United States individual states have their 
own tax regulations, including the use of credits or deductions to promote private charity. This 
paper considers only incentives at the national level.  
 
(1)  Income tax incentives 
 
There are two types of income tax incentives that reduce the price of giving: tax deductions and 
tax credits. Deductions reduce the amount of income taxed while credits reduce the tax due. In 
the United States, for example, taxpayers can deduct the full amount of a charitable gift from 
their taxable incomes if they itemize their tax returns.
26 In effect, the price of the gift is reduced 
by the amount that would have been due on the income, which is proportional to the marginal tax 
rate. Marginal tax rates on income in the United States range from 10% to 35%. For Americans 
in the top income bracket with incomes above $336,550, the 2006 marginal tax rate is 35%.
27 If 
someone from this tax bracket gives $100 to charity and takes the charitable deduction, they save 
$35 in taxes. The net cost of the gift becomes $65.
28 Meanwhile, Canadian taxpayers can take a 
federal tax credit equal to 17% of the first $200 donated to registered charities in a taxation year, 
and 29% for amounts beyond the first $200. In Canada, a $100 donation results in a 17% federal 
tax credit, bringing the price of that giving to $83.  
  
 (2)  Estate tax incentives 
 
Some countries that levy taxes on estate bequests exempt or reduce the tax rate for gifts to 
charity. Estate tax incentives operate in much the same way as income tax deductions in that the 
                                                 
25 Clotfelter (1985) also finds empirical evidence that both the price and income effect cause people to increase 
charitable giving. 
26 There is a ceiling on the amount of eligible donations in the U.S. In 2004, Americans could claim 50% of taxable 
income as a charitable deduction. 
27 IRS (2005a). 
28 Currently, itemized deductions are phased out (reduced) as income rises. Starting in 2006, the deduction phase-out 
will be reduced by one-third. In 2008, it will be reduced by two-thirds. And in 2010, the phase-out will disappear 
entirely. 
  11estate tax reduces the cost of charitable donations relative to the cost of other bequests. Under 
current U.S. law charitable bequests are 100% deductible, though the 2001 Tax Act started a 
gradual phase-out of the estate tax beginning in 2002 until full repeal in 2010 before reverting 
back to pre-2001 rates in 2011. 
 
The preponderance of evidence suggests that U.S. estate tax incentives promote charitable gifts 
(Bakija and Gale 2003). As with income tax incentives, the price of the charitable bequest falls 
by the marginal estate tax rate. Though only a small percentage of decedents are subject to the 
estate tax, the marginal tax rates are high and exemption from the estate tax can as a result create 
strong financial incentives for charitable transfers at death (Clotfelter 1997). For the 2004 tax 
year, the U.S. federal estate tax applied to net estates in excess of $1.5 million and the top 
marginal estate tax rate was 48%. The independent U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimated in 2004 that the estate tax leads affluent individuals to donate more than they 
otherwise would. Since estate tax liability is reduced through donations made both during life 
and at death, the CBO (2004) asserts that, as of 2000, estate tax repeal would have reduced 
charitable contributions made during life by between 6 percent and 11 percent and would have 
led to a reduction in charitable bequests of 16 percent to 28 percent. Bakija and Gale (2003) of 
the Brookings-Urban Tax Policy Center and Greene and McCleland (2001) similarly find that 
repeal of the estate tax would reduce charitable bequests. But Schervish (2001) argues that repeal 
of the estate tax would increase charitable gifts by increasing overall wealth, bringing income 
effect–increases in giving greater than the decline from the lost price effect. This seems unlikely, 
however, given the strength of the 48% price incentive.  
 
(3)   Capital gains tax incentives 
 
Capital gains tax exemptions can also induce charitable donations. In the United States donations 
of stock may actually be the “cheapest” method of giving, as givers can take advantage of both 
income tax deductions and capital gains deductions. According to the IRS (2003), securities 
donated to charity are not subject to any capital gains taxes—neither for the donor nor for the 
charity upon sale of the stock. In other words, all donations of appreciated stock held for at least 
one year do not incur capital gains levies, effectively permitting a double incentive for giving: 
first through avoidance of a capital gains tax and then through the allowed income tax deduction. 
The gain is not counted as taxable income but the donation is deductible from taxable income.
29 
As a result, the higher the capital gains tax rate, the cheaper charitable donations of stock are 
relative to the cost of selling the stock (or donating an equivalent amount in cash). For example, 
stock worth $100 is cheaper to the individual as a charitable donation than both $100 in a cash 
donation and selling the stock and donating the proceeds (an action that incurs capital gains 
taxes). In 2004, the maximum tax rate on gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than 
12 months in the United States was 15%.
30
 
3.2.   “Income effect” of low tax ratios 
 
Government tax policy can also increase private charitable giving through an “income effect.” 
Simply stated, when the tax-GDP ratio is lower, individuals and corporations have more after-tax 
                                                 
29 See Randolph (1999) for an overview of the double incentive. 
30 IRS (2005b). 
  12income to give to charity (Clotfelter 1985; Brooks 2004). In this way, however, the marginal and 
average tax rates can create opposite incentives to give. High marginal tax rates increase the 
incentive to give through the price effect in countries where tax deductions are offered, but high 
average tax rates decrease the incentive to give through the income effect of more in-pocket 
income.  
 
4.  New data on DAC country tax policies 
 
While the tax treatment of charitable contributions has been heavily studied, most analyses deal 
primarily with estimating price elasticities of giving and most concern tax treatment only in the 
United States.
31 But to understand the role of domestic tax policy in encouraging public giving, 
consistent cross-country data on the specific issues detailed above are needed. However, 
comprehensive information on fiscal policies, treatment of charitable donations, and private 
giving trends across individual countries is not available in a single location. Tax policy as it 
affects international private giving remains a largely ignored aspect of foreign aid policy.  
 
To partly fill this gap in knowledge, between November 2004 and March 2005 CGD conducted a 
data-gathering exercise on DAC country tax policies. The bulk of the new data come from 
responses to a cross-country survey of DAC embassy and tax officials. 
 
4.1.  Methodology: Cross-country survey of national tax policies 
 
In order to compile tax data in a manner suitable for cross-country comparison and analysis, in 
November 2004 CGD circulated a survey of national tax policy to all 22 DAC countries except 
Luxembourg. (A sample survey is attached in Appendix 1.)  
 
While the tax code influences charitable donations in two ways, our survey focused on the use of 
targeted tax incentives to promote giving. Charitable deductions and credits reflect direct effort 
on the part of a government to promote private donations. Clotfelter (1997) asserts that the price 
effect of giving is the most important component of the overall predicted effect on giving in 
almost any simulation of tax changes and, as a result, has received particular scrutiny in most 
statistical analyses of the impact of tax policies on giving. Despite this there is no comprehensive 
source detailing the use of tax incentives across different countries. By comparison, there are 
good data from the OECD on national tax ratios that allow for easy comparisons across DAC 
countries. 
 
With this in mind, our survey concentrated on the use of price incentives to promote giving in 
each of the three ways described earlier: income tax incentives, estate tax incentives, and capital 
gains incentives. In addition to basic questions on how countries use each type of incentive, 
several other aspects of tax policy were explored.  
 
Taxpayer qualification. In some countries not all taxpayers qualify for tax incentives. For 
example, in the United States only taxpayers who itemize their income tax deductions 
qualify. According to the IRS (2004) around one-third of American taxpayers itemize, 
                                                 
31 There are many elasticity estimates in the U.S. For examples, see Tiehan (2001), Clotfelter (1985), Steinberg 
(1990) and Andreoni (2001). 
  13leaving the rest unable to claim charitable deductions. In general, only the relatively well-
off can benefit from itemization and, though low and middle-income people typically 
give a higher share of their income to charity than the wealthy, the bulk of total donations 
come from the richest segment of society. Schervish and Havens (2003) find that the top 
25% of American households (those with incomes above $70,000) give 70% of total 
charitable gifts while a 2004 Independent Sector study finds that the wealthiest 
Americans are “most likely to itemize their deductions.”
32  The survey thus sought 
information on restrictions in place that limit the ability of taxpayers to take advantage of 
incentives as well as estimates of the number of eligible taxpayers.   
 
Floors and ceilings. The imposition of floors or ceilings on donation eligibility by 
governments can influence giving. For example, in order to qualify for incentives in 
Ireland contributions must be at least €250. Incentive restrictions also work in the other 
direction. In Denmark taxpayers can only deduct up to 5,000 DKK ($787 USD). While 
measuring the exact effect of these restrictions on giving is difficult, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that caps on eligible donations can limit the amount of gifts.  
 
To complement our survey data, we also consulted tax regulations and statistical offices at the 
individual country level as well as the European Tax Handbook 2004 published by the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The European Tax Handbook is a 
compendium of general tax code information across all European countries, the United States, 
and Canada. The various sources allowed us to create a relatively complete dataset of tax policies 
for most of the 21 countries in our sample.  
 
4.2.  Evidence on the use of price incentives 
 
Data from the two key resources (CGD tax survey and European Tax Handbook) combine for a 
fairly comprehensive overview of the use of tax incentives to promote giving across the DAC. 
Out of 21 countries, 13 completed the survey. Response quality ranged considerably. Generally, 
information on income and estate tax incentives was more complete than information on capital 
gains tax incentives. Some respondents, including Switzerland and Australia, reported that good 
data did not exist for most of our questions.  
  
In addition to data on government’s use of different tax incentives, we also explored whether 
taxpayers commonly take advantage of these incentives. This type of information is not available 
for all countries. But, for example, tax deduction data from the IRS and survey data from both 
the Independent Sector and AAFRC illustrate the extent to which Americans claim federal tax 
incentives. Using this data, we can make several broad conclusions about both government and 
taxpayer use of price incentives that promote private charitable giving.  
 
(1)  Income tax deductions are the most common incentive  
 
Eighteen of our 21 countries employ some type of income tax incentive, making it the 
most common (Table 4). Of the 18, 12 allow taxpayers a full tax deduction on charitable 
gifts. The other six use tax credits. The value of the credits ranges widely by country, but 
                                                 
32 Independent Sector (2004). 
  14most are worth between 25% and 33% of the contribution. Canada, New Zealand, 
Portugal and Spain all offer tax credits in this range. At the bottom end of the scale, Italy 
gives a 19% credit. France offers taxpayers 60%, easily the largest. Only Austria, Finland 
and Sweden offer no income incentive. It should be kept in mind that some of the 
incentives in Table 4 are more complex than the table seems to suggest, the restriction of 
the U.S. deduction to itemizers being one example.  
 
Table 4. Summary of income tax incentives to promote private charitable giving 
Deduction (12) Credit (6) No Incentive (3)
Australia Canada (29%) Austria
Belgium France (60%) Finland
Denmark Italy (19%) Sweden








United States  
 
(2)   Estate tax exemptions also common    
 
Though less prevalent than income tax incentives, exempting charitable bequests from estate 
taxes is also common in many DAC countries (Table 5). Six countries do not tax estates: 
Australia, Canada, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland. Of the remaining 15 that have 
an estate tax, 11 offer some sort of incentive for bequests to charity—ranging from full 
exemption to a reduced tax rate. For example, nine countries, including the United Kingdom and 
the United States, completely exempt charitable bequests from substantial inheritance tax rates. 
Instead of a full exemption, the Netherlands and Austria offer reduced tax rates for charitable 
bequests, both around one-third the in tax rate for bequests to relatives. Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden tax estates but offer no relief for donations to charitable organizations.  
  
Table 5. Summary of estate tax incentives to promote private charitable giving 
Full exemption (9) Partial exemption (2) No exemption (4) No estate tax (6)
Belgium Netherlands (11% charity rate vs. 30% standard) Denmark Australia
France Austria (5% vs. 15%) Finland Canada
Germany Norway Italy





United States  
 
But bequests do not appear to be a major source of charitable giving. Where data is available, 
estate bequests appear small compared to donations from living individuals. According to Giving 
USA 2004, estate bequests accounted for only 9% of total American charitable giving ($23 
billion) in 2003. By comparison, living individuals contributed almost 75% of the total ($160 
billion). Foundations and corporations were responsible for the remainder. The CBO concurs, 
  15estimating that bequests totaled just 8% of total donations with $16 billion out of $196 billion in 
2000 (CBO 2004). A similar pattern is seen in Australia. Givewell (2005) estimates that bequests 
account for just 4% of the total income of charities. 
 
The effect of the estate tax on international giving, however, may be even less consequential.  
According to Giving USA, charitable bequests figure almost exclusively as gifts to educational 
institutions, medical research institutions, museums, and private foundations. If this is true, even 
if bequests amount to $23 billion in charitable donations annually very little of this probably 
goes to international causes. This suggests that the impact of estate tax exemptions as a price 
incentive to give internationally is small.  
 
(3)   Unclear use and impact of capital gains tax incentives  
 
Income tax breaks and estate tax exemptions appear to be the main methods used by DAC 
countries to actively promote giving through their tax code. The role of capital gains incentives is 
more complicated, but these do not appear to be as common, nor play a large role either. Many 
countries have no special capital gains tax, some treating capital gains as regular income—
meaning that capital gains deductions use the same regulations as income tax deductions—and 
others not taxing capital gains at all. Some countries that tax capital gains, meanwhile, only give 
deductions for cash gifts. 
 
There is very little cross-country data on the share breakdown between donations of stock versus 
donations of cash. Where data does exist, stock donations make up a small share of total private 
giving. According to IRS public data, in the United States non-cash contributions—which 
include donations of securities—are not the major source of charitable deductions (IRS 2004). In 
2001 U.S. taxpayers claimed approximately $139 billion worth of charitable deductions. Of this 
total, approximately 76% came as cash donations. Meanwhile, non-cash donations comprised 
24% of total deductions, or $38 billion. While $38 billion is far from a trivial amount, non-cash 
donations include not only securities but property and in-kind gifts as well. Non-cash donations 
are heavily skewed to the higher income bracket, even more so than cash contributions. Of the 
$38 billion total, 71% came from people making more than $100,000. Nearly 25% came from 
those with an income above $10 million. Since donations of appreciated securities are viewed as 
the most cost-effective means for taxpayers to contribute to charity, capital gains taxes may be an 
important consideration for wealthy Americans when making their giving decisions. But, based 
on our preliminary evidence, the majority of taxpayers still make most donations in cash.  
 
(4)   Use of ceilings 
 
Most countries in our sample cap eligible deductions and credits (Table 6). In countries where 
high-income people account for most charity in the aggregate, caps might substantially limit the 
incentive effect. According to the Independent Sector (2004), Americans with incomes above $1 
million are “most likely to give major gifts and to consider the tax consequences when doing so.” 
There is also the likely existence of a 20-80 rule—at least before incentives enter the picture—
where 20% of the people give 80% of the money. Schervish and Havens (2003) find that the top 
25% of American households give 70% of total charitable gifts. If this same pattern holds in 
other countries, caps could greatly limit the incentive to give. 
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Table 6. Ceilings on eligible donations 
No ceiling (3) "High" ceiling (12) "Low" ceiling (3) No price incentive (3)
Australia Belgium (10% of income) Denmark (5,000 DKK) Austria
Ireland Canada (60% of income) New Zealand (630 NZD) Finland
United Kingdom France (20% of income) Norway (6,000 NOK) Sweden
Germany (5% of income)
Greece (10% of income)
Italy (€2,065)
Japan (25% of income)
Netherlands (10% of income)
Portugal (15% of income)
Spain (10% of income)
Switzerland (10% of income)
United States (50% of income)  
 
Of the 18 countries that offer a targeted income tax incentive, 15 cap eligible deductions. Only 
Australia, Ireland and the United Kingdom place no limit on the amount of donation eligible for 
charitable tax incentives. Most ceilings range between 10% and 25% of income. Belgium, 
France, Greece
33, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland all cap eligible donations 
in this range. The United States and Canada employ the highest ceilings, at 50% and 60%, 
respectively. Italy caps donations at €2,065 and Germany at 5% of income. While these caps are 
at high enough levels that they probably do not limit contributions by average donors, they may 
influence giving decisions by the richest members of a society. Most caps are formulated as 
shares of taxable income, which can be deceptively small for the richest donors, who earn a large 
portion of their income through the appreciation of securities, which is only considered taxable 
income when the securities are sold. On the other and, at least in the United States and for now, 
itemized deductions are phased out (reduced) anyway as income rises. Starting in 2006, the 
deduction phase-out will be reduced by one-third. In 2008, it will be reduced by two-thirds. And 
in 2010, the phase-out will disappear entirely. 
 
Low ceilings almost certainly reduce donations in three countries: Denmark, Norway and New 
Zealand. New Zealand caps eligible donations at $630 NZD ($433 USD), Denmark at 5,000 
DKK ($787 USD), and Norway at 6,000 NOK ($909 USD).
34
 
A comparison of New Zealand and U.S. tax return data suggests New Zealand’s low ceiling on 
donation eligibility affects the level of donations. Private giving in New Zealand does not range 
in absolute terms nearly as much across income groups as it does in the United States. In New 
Zealand in 1999, the top income group claimed only 6% of total deductions while comprising 
5% of the total returns claiming deductions.
35 In the United States, meanwhile, people with 
incomes above $100,000 claimed 54% of all charitable deductions in 2001.
36 This same group 
comprised 25% of the total returns filed claiming deductions. The large difference between the 
two countries might be due to the low maximum rebate offered in New Zealand, a level easily 
reached by people in many income brackets. Such a low ceiling might flatten the overall 
distribution and restrict total giving of the high-income population. 
                                                 
33 Uniquely, Greece gives full deductibility up to a certain amount (€2950) and imposes a low tax (10%) on 
contributions above the threshold. 
34 Norway changed the cap to 12,000 NOK in 2005. 
35 New Zealand Inland Revenue, “1999 IR3 and IR5 Returns with Donations Rebate - by taxable income.” 
36 IRS (2004). 
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(5) Scandinavian  outliers 
 
Only two countries offer no charitable tax break: Finland and Sweden. And though Denmark and 
Norway both offer income tax incentives, they both place restrictive caps on eligible deductions.  
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are also the only four countries in the sample that tax 
estates but offer no deduction for charitable bequests. This group of countries stands apart from 
most of their DAC peers. Section 6 explores the deep causes of this difference.  
 
5.  Estimates of the impact of tax policies on private giving  
 
Given the size of private aid to poor countries and the ability of governments to design tax 
policies that affect these flows, it is worth considering the actual impact of tax policies on giving. 
As in Roodman (2004), we estimate the proportional increase in giving caused by each country’s 
tax policies, compare that to actual giving, and then work backwards to estimate how much 
giving would have occurred in the absence of the policies and how much is a credit to their 
presence. We have revised the methodology to take account of credits and caps, and have 
updated the data. The calculation is the basis for the inclusion of private giving in the 2005 
Commitment to Development Index (Roodman 2005a).
37
 
The approach taken here will seem simplistic to some and too sophisticated to others. To make 
the calculations practical, we make several simplifying assumptions: taxpayers are treated as a 
single representative agent, complicated tax provisions are standardized and simplified, rough 
tax rate estimates are used, certain fixed elasticities are assumed, and charitable giving to 
developing countries is treated the same as charitable giving in general.  
 
5.1.  “Price effect” estimates 
 
Only income tax incentives are included in our calculation. As detailed earlier, several countries 
give tax exemptions for charitable bequests, but the lack of data on the breakdown in giving by 
type of gift across countries combined with evidence that estate bequests do not constitute the 
major source of giving lead us to exclude bequests from our calculation. The same is true for 
capital gains tax incentives, which are also not included here.  
 
We translate the presence of an income tax incentive into an estimate of the increase in charitable 
giving in three steps. First, we express the tax measure as a price effect. For credits, this step is 
straightforward. Canada’s 29% tax credit, for example, reduces the price of giving by 29%. For 
deductions, we used a crude but available proxy for the marginal income tax rate faced by the 
households with above-average incomes that appear to generate most charity. This proxy is the 
typical marginal income tax rate for workers at 167% of the income level of the average 
production worker from the OECD Tax Database (OECD 2005). For example, this tax rate is 
31.4% for the United States in 2003, so deductibility of charitable giving in the United States is 
treated as reducing the price by 31.4%. 
 
                                                 
37 See www.cgdev.org for full 2005 CDI results and background papers. 
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high-income, high-giving people account for most charity in the aggregate, caps can severely 
limit the incentive effect in practice. Precisely how much, however, is hard to know, especially 
because there is little information about the distribution of giving by income group outside the 
United States. Given the uncertainty, we factor caps in coarsely, by taking the simple average of 
the below- and above-threshold price incentives. For most countries with caps, the above-
threshold price incentive is 0—there is no tax incentive to exceed the cap—so the price effect is 
halved. The exception is Greece, which offers full deductibility up to €2950 each year, then 
imposes a 10% tax above that limit. Since Greece’s representative marginal income tax is 25.2%, 
the above-threshold price incentive is the difference between this and the special tax rate, i.e., 
15.2%. So the simple average of the below- and above-threshold rates for Greece is 20.2%. 
 
Finally, having estimated the price effect, we couple it with an estimate of the price elasticity of 
giving. Research puts it at around 0.5 in the United States (Andreoni 2001). Thus, if a 
representative individual in the United States faces a price effect of 31.4%, full deductibility of 
charitable contributions multiplies giving by a factor of (1 – 0.314)
–0.5 = 1.208, for a 20.8% 
increase. (See Table 7). Overall, we find that the French tax credit results in 58% more charitable 
donations, the highest on the list. The Netherlands is next with a 44% increase in giving resulting 
from a full income tax deduction. Of the 18 countries with some type of income tax incentive, 
New Zealand’s appears weakest. New Zealand allows taxpayers a 33% tax credit for charitable 
gifts, but only on donations up to $630 NZD ($433 USD). According to our methodology, this 
cap reduces the value of the tax incentive to 16.7%, leading to an increase in giving of only 10%. 
 





















Australia Yes 48.5% 0.0% No 48.5% 39.3%
Austria No 31.7% 0.0% No 0.0% 0.0%
Belgium Yes 45.1% 0.0% No 45.1% 35.0%
Canada No 39.4% 29.0% No 29.0% 18.7%
Denmark Yes 54.3% 0.0% Yes 27.2% 17.2%
Finland No 44.5% 0.0% No 0.0% 0.0%
France No 25.4% 60.0% No 60.0% 58.1%
Germany Yes 50.1% 0.0% No 50.1% 41.6%
Greece Yes 25.2% 0.0% No 20.2% 11.9%
Ireland Yes 42.0% 0.0% No 42.0% 31.3%
Italy No 46.6% 19.0% No 19.0% 11.1%
Japan Yes 20.4% 0.0% No 20.4% 12.1%
Netherlands Yes 52.0% 0.0% No 52.0% 44.3%
New Zealand No 39.0% 33.3% Yes 16.7% 9.5%
Norway Yes 41.5% 0.0% Yes 20.7% 12.3%
Portugal No 24.0% 25.0% No 25.0% 15.5%
Spain No 26.2% 25.0% No 25.0% 15.5%
Sweden No 51.2% 0.0% No 0.0% 0.0%
Switzerland Yes 22.9% 0.0% No 22.9% 13.9%
United Kingdom Yes 22.0% 0.0% No 22.0% 13.2%
United States Yes 31.4% 0.0% No 31.4% 20.8%  
Notes: 
1 Marginal income tax rate for single individual at 167% income level of the average production worker. 
2 Uniquely, 
Greece gives full deductibility up to a certain amount (€2950) and imposes a low tax (10%) on contributions above the threshold. 
The tax incentive is therefore computed as the average of the below- and above-threshold incentives. 
3 Assumed price elasticity 
of giving is –0.5. Increase in giving calculated according to the formula: (100% – tax incentive%)
–0.5–100%. 
Sources: OECD (2005), Table I.1; OECD (2004); authors' calculations. 
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5.2.  “Income effect” estimates 
 
We use a similar method to estimate the effect of lower taxes. In countries where the overall tax 
ratio is lower, individuals have more money to give to charity. Thus, while high marginal tax 
rates increase the incentive to give when we look at the price effects of tax deductions, high 
average tax rates decrease the incentive to give when we look at income effects. Tax ratio data 
are from the OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2003 (OECD 2004). To reward countries for lower 
tax ratios, we need a baseline against which to define lowness. We choose Sweden’s 2000 tax 
ratio, the highest among the 21 scored countries in 2000 (the last year with data available for the 
first edition of the CDI). We combine this with an estimate of the income elasticity of giving of 
1.1 (Andreoni 2001). The United States, to continue the example from the previous section, is 
treated as having reduced its total tax burden in 2002, the last year with data available for 
calculations done here, from Sweden’s 2000 ratio of 53.8% to the actual U.S. ratio of 26.4%. 
This hypothetically raises the privately claimed share of GDP from 46.2% to 73.6%, an increase 
of 59.3%. As a result, the lower U.S. tax burden is estimated to multiply charity by 
 
 
Table 8 gives the results of applying this formula to all DAC countries. Countries with the lowest 
tax ratios—including Japan, the United States, and Ireland—are of course rewarded most for 
leaving private citizens more money in-pocket to donate to charity. 
 
Table 8. Income effect estimates 





















United Kingdom 36% 44%
United States 26% 67%  
Notes: 
1 Assumed income elasticity of giving = 1.1. Increase in giving calculated according to the formula: (100% – tax ratio% / 
100%–53.8%)
1.1  –100%, where 53.8% is the tax ratio for Sweden in the base year of 2000. 
Sources: OECD (2005), Table I.1; OECD (2004); authors' calculations. 
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5.3.  Combined effect of tax policies on private giving 
 
We next combine our estimates of the price and income effects to calculate the total effect of 
fiscal policy on charitable giving. Since in the elasticity framework effects are multiplicative, the 
proper way to combine the effects is by multiplication. In the U.S. case, the multipliers combine 
to 1.208 × 1.669 = 2.015. We then divide this overall multiplier into observed giving in order to 
estimate giving in the absence of favorable policies. As described in Section 2, we use “grants by 
NGOs” to both Part I and Part II countries from DAC Table 1 as our measure of private giving. 
For the United States, observed giving of $10.58 billion in 2003 happens to be 2.015 times $5.25 
billion, so U.S. policy is credited for the difference, $5.33 billion. 
 
These results suggest that tax policy is playing a major role in increasing private giving. Table 9 
gives the combined increase of the two types of fiscal policies that influence private giving. 
Charitable giving in Sweden, with no tax incentive and the highest tax ratio, is apparently 9% 
higher in 2003 due to current tax policy than it would in the counterfactual (all of this increase 
comes from a decline in the tax ratio since 2000). This is the lowest figure among the countries 
studied. Finland and Austria, the other two countries without price incentives, have the next two 
lowest increases in giving due to fiscal policy with 19% and 24%, respectively. But fiscal policy 
appears to significantly increase private giving in other DAC countries. Private aid to developing 
countries appears to be over twice as high in Australia, Ireland, Germany, and the United States 
thanks to favorable tax policies. In these four countries, tax policy increased charitable giving by 
a combined $6.2 billion.  
 
Across all 21 countries, giving is perhaps nearly $7.5 billion more due to favorable tax policies 
(Table 9). Part I countries receive $5.3 billion of this additional assistance, with most of the rest 
apparently being U.S. flows to Israel. Against the benchmark of Sweden’s policies in 2000 
(tax/GDP of 53.8% and no incentives), tax policy is doubling private giving. More than two-
thirds of the increase takes place in the United States. While this is a substantial total, private 
giving is still small compared to public aid. In 2003, Net Aid Transfers from DAC countries to 
Part I and Part II countries totaled $60 billion. Most countries still give substantially more public 
than private aid. In seven DAC countries—Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Sweden—private giving comprises less than 10% of total net transfers. Private giving 
appears biggest relative to public aid in the United States and Ireland. 
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Australia 39.3% 54.2% 114.9% 337 157                            180 337 157                             180
Austria 0.0% 23.6% 23.6% 71 58                              14 83 67                               16
Belgium 35.0% 17.8% 58.9% 165 104                            61 165 104                             61
Canada 18.7% 48.3% 76.0% 566 322                            244 565 321                             244
Denmark 17.2% 11.7% 30.9% 17 13                              4 18 14                               4
Finland 0.0% 19.0% 19.0% 13 11                              2 13 11                               2
France 58.1% 23.6% 95.4% 280 143                            137 280 143                             137
Germany 41.6% 43.1% 102.6% 1,008 498                            511 1,107 546                             561
Greece 11.9% 43.4% 60.5% 8 5                                3 7 4                                 3
Ireland 31.3% 61.9% 112.6% 283 133                            150 283 133                             150
Italy 11.1% 27.0% 41.1% 27 19                              8 27 19                               8
Japan 12.1% 68.4% 88.7% 335 178                            158 335 178                             157
Netherlands 44.3% 35.3% 95.2% 379 194                            185 379 194                             185
New Zealand 9.5% 45.8% 59.7% 18 11                              7 18 11                               7
Norway 12.3% 24.8% 40.2% 452 322                            129 451 322                             129
Portugal 15.5% 48.3% 71.2% 4 2                                2 3 2                                 1
Spain 15.5% 44.1% 66.4% 133 80                              53 132 79                               53
Sweden 0.0% 8.6% 8.6% 23 22                              2 23 21                               2
Switzerland 13.9% 57.2% 79.0% 280 157                            124 291 163                             128
United Kingdom 13.2% 43.6% 62.6% 389 239                            150 393 242                             151
United States 20.8% 66.9% 101.5% 6,326 3,139                         3,187 10,580 5,249                          5,331
Part I Part I + Part II
Total giving due to favorable tax policies (US$ mn) 5,309 7,510
Total giving in absence of favorable tax policies (US$ mn) 5,805 7,980
Overall % increase from favorable tax policies 91% 94%  
 
Notes: 
1 From Table 7. 
2 From Table 8. 
3 Increase in giving calculated according to the formula: (1+Price incentive increase) × 
(1+Income effect increase) – 1. 
4 Most recent year of available data. 
5 Calculated according to the formula: (Combined increase) / 
(1+Current giving). 
6 Calculated according to the formula: (Current giving) – (Giving in absence of tax policies).  
Sources: OECD/DAC (2005a); Roodman (2005a); Roodman (2005b); authors’ calculations.  
 
But while private giving is relatively large compared to government aid in the United States, it is 
not large compared to public aid delivered by other countries. Table 10 gives private giving per 
capita and net transfers per capita to Part I countries. While the United States gives $22 per 
person annually in private charity to the world’s poorest countries, nine DAC countries give 
more than $100 per person annually in public foreign aid.  U.S. private giving per capita is less 
than public aid per capita from every DAC country. 
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NAT per capita 
(US$)
Pvt giving per 
capita (US$)
Pvt giving 
attributed to tax 
policies per 
capita (US$)
Australia 1,212 337 180 1,214 337 180 60.95 16.97 9.07
Austria 464 71 14 544 84 16 57.38 8.83 1.68
Belgium 1,098 165 61 1,127 165 61 105.84 15.94 5.91
Canada 1,933 566 244 1,978 566 244 61.12 17.89 7.73
Denmark 1,740 17 4 1,855 19 4 322.99 3.14 0.74
Finland 558 13 2 598 14 2 107.04 2.40 0.38
France 3,902 280 137 5,133 280 137 65.29 4.69 2.29
Germany 5,154 1,008 511 5,522 1,108 561 62.44 12.21 6.19
Greece 362 8 3 383 8 3 32.83 0.68 0.26
Ireland 504 283 150 505 283 150 126.08 70.93 37.57
Italy 1,834 27 8 1,850 28 8 31.82 0.47 0.14
Japan 6,014 335 158 5,676 335 157 47.14 2.63 1.23
Netherlands 3,680 379 185 3,833 379 185 226.86 23.34 11.39
New Zealand 165 18 7 166 18 7 41.27 4.54 1.70
Norway 2,020 452 129 2,068 452 129 442.77 99.01 28.37
Portugal 312 4 2 313 4 1 29.90 0.38 0.16
Spain 1,842 133 53 1,847 133 53 44.81 3.23 1.29
Sweden 2,235 23 2 2,341 23 2 249.57 2.62 0.21
Switzerland 1,262 280 124 1,329 292 128 171.76 38.12 16.82
United Kingdom 6,156 389 150 6,228 394 151 103.76 6.55 2.52
United States 14,448 6,326 3,187 15,789 10,580 5,331 49.68 21.75 10.96 
Notes: 
1 Most recent year of available data. There are four countries with private giving data from a year other than 2003: 
Denmark (2001), France (1995), Norway (2002), and Spain (1998). 
Sources: OECD/DAC (2005a); Roodman (2005b); World Bank (2005). 
 
Table 11 shows that adding to official aid the private giving attributable to public policy—or 
even adding all private giving—does not greatly change the usual league table of donors ranked 
by aid/GDP. Ireland and the United States donate the most as a share of GDP. But the sum of 
private donations and public net transfers from the United States to Part I countries was still just 
0.19% of GDP in 2003, placing it 18
th among our 21 DAC countries.  
 











NAT + Pvt 
giving (% 
GDP)
NAT + Pvt 
giving from 
tax policies (% 
GDP)
Australia 0.23% 0.06% 0.03% 0.30% 0.27%
Austria 0.18% 0.03% 0.01% 0.21% 0.19%
Belgium 0.36% 0.05% 0.02% 0.42% 0.38%
Canada 0.23% 0.07% 0.03% 0.29% 0.25%
Denmark 0.82% 0.01% 0.00% 0.83% 0.82%
Finland 0.34% 0.01% 0.00% 0.35% 0.35%
France 0.22% 0.02% 0.01% 0.24% 0.23%
Germany 0.21% 0.04% 0.02% 0.26% 0.24%
Greece 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.21%
Ireland 0.33% 0.18% 0.10% 0.51% 0.43%
Italy 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.13%
Japan 0.14% 0.01% 0.00% 0.15% 0.14%
Netherlands 0.72% 0.07% 0.04% 0.79% 0.76%
New Zealand 0.21% 0.02% 0.01% 0.23% 0.22%
Norway 0.91% 0.20% 0.06% 1.12% 0.97%
Portugal 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.21%
Spain 0.22% 0.02% 0.01% 0.24% 0.23%
Sweden 0.74% 0.01% 0.00% 0.75% 0.74%
Switzerland 0.39% 0.09% 0.04% 0.48% 0.43%
United Kingdom 0.34% 0.02% 0.01% 0.36% 0.35%
United States 0.13% 0.06% 0.03% 0.19% 0.16%  
Notes: 
1 Most recent year of available data. There are four countries with private giving data from a year other than 2003: 
Denmark (2001), France (1995), Norway (2002), and Spain (1998).
Sources: World Bank (2005); OECD/DAC (2005a); Roodman (2005b).
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5.4.  Outstanding data issues 
 
Even with the new data, major gaps remain in our understanding of the relationship between 
private giving and tax incentives. No two households are in exactly the same financial position, 
and the tax codes present different incentives to different households and, of course, different 
people respond to the same incentives differently. Giving patterns by income group in each 
country, however, remain largely unavailable. We also use only elasticity estimates from the 
United States and do not differentiate between international and private donations. Finally, not 
enough countries contributed answers to the question of eligibility to allow it to be 
incorporated.
38 With this in mind, better cross-country data on giving patterns among income 
groups and elasticity estimates—including for international giving—would improve our 
calculations. 
 
6.  The causes and consequences of tax policies that affect private giving 
 
In this section, we explore some interesting and plausible hypotheses about the causes and 
consequences of tax policies that influence charitable giving, as measured above. First, we 
consider how certain societal characteristics may affect the strength of price incentives and tax 
ratios. Second, we examine the relationship of these tax policies and other societal characteristics 
with actual giving levels. Since the sample is just 21 countries, all of the results are merely 
suggestive.  
 
6.1.   Correlates of tax policies 
 
Tax codes reflect the wide range of issues and beliefs that represent dominant societal norms and 
social characteristics. How tax codes come to be designed and implemented may be as much a 
public concern as the consequences of tax systems (Kay 1990). We thus explore simple 
relationships between tax incentives and four societal characteristics: (1) national income; (2) 
population; (3) religious participation; and (4) confidence in government. 
 
(1)  Tax incentives and income 
 
First, we consider the relationship between a country’s income and the extent to which the tax 
system favors private charity. Countries with higher incomes per capita may not need to offer tax 
incentives to reduce the price of giving since citizens already have more money available to 
donate (Billitteri 1999). To study this relationship, we compare 2003 GNI per capita in our 21 
DAC countries with both the level of price incentive and the tax ratio. 
  
The strength of the price incentive has very little observable relationship with income (Figure 1). 
Rich countries appear just as likely to employ strong price incentives as poor countries. In a 
simple regression on the level of price incentive, the coefficient on log income per capita is 0.12 
with a t-score of 0.59.  
 
                                                 
38 Australia, however, claimed that around 35% of taxpayers itemized in 2001—a figure similar to U.S. estimates of 
33%. 









































9.8 10 10.2 10.4 10.6
Log income per capita
coef = 0.12; se = 0.21; t = 0.59
 
Sources: World Bank (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
 
There similarly appears to be very little relationship between a country’s per capita income and 
its citizens’ tax ratio (Figure 2). The richest countries in the sample have both the smallest and 
largest governments. In a simple regression on tax ratio, the coefficient on log income per capita 
is 0.00 with a t-score of 0.01. 
 













































9.8 10 10.2 10.4 10.6
Log income per capita
coef = 0.00; se = 0.09; t = 0.01
 
Sources: World Bank (2005) and OECD (2004). 
 
  25(2)  Tax incentives and population 
 
We next explore the role of country size in determining the level of income tax incentives. There 
may be several reasons why larger countries have lower tax ratios. Alesina and Spolaore (2003) 
argue that there are significant economies of scale for many state-provided services, including 
defense, infrastructure, and tax administration. In general, more-populous countries can afford 
proportionally smaller government by spreading costs over many taxpayers. There may also be 
non-economic factors that lead larger countries to lower average tax rates. People in countries 
with larger populations may feel more disconnected from the central government, which plays 
less of a central role in citizen’s lives. Such countries might be less likely to impose a higher tax 
ratio on their citizen’s—who are less likely to accept such an interventionist government—and, 
similarly, may be more likely to offer tax incentives to promote the private allocation of 
charitable wealth. To analyze this relationship, we compare 2003 population in our 21 DAC 
countries with both the price incentive and the tax ratio.  
 
Based on these data, there is not a strong relationship between population and the strength of 
price incentives (Figure 3). In a simple regression on the level of price incentive, the coefficient 
on log population is 0.04 with a t-score of 1.37. While this represents a slightly positive 
association between larger populations and stronger income tax incentives, this relationship is 
not significant at the 10% level. 
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Log population
coef = 0.04; se = 0.03; t = 1.37
 
Sources: World Bank (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
 
But more populous countries appear to have smaller governments (Figure 4). In a simple 
regression on tax ratio, the coefficient on log population is –0.02 with a t-score of –1.89, which 
is significant at the 10% level. Japan and the United States—the two most populous countries in 
the DAC—also impose the lowest tax ratios on their citizens. Conversely, the much smaller 
Scandinavian countries—along with Austria and Belgium—tax their citizens at much higher 
  26levels. This relationship is not particularly robust based on our small sample, as dropping Japan 
causes it to lose significance. 
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Log population
coef = -0.02; se = 0.01; t = -1.89
 
Sources: World Bank (2005) and OECD (2004). 
(3)  Tax incentives and religious participation 
 
ext we look at the relationship with religious faith and practice. Brooks (2003) asserts that 
o assess the relationship between religious faith and tax policy, we use data on church 
ighly religious societies appear as likely to offer strong price incentives as societies whose 
                                                
 
N
highly religious people differ from people with secular leanings in their view of the 
government’s proper role in providing social welfare. He cites results from the National Opinion 
Research Center’s 1996 General Social Survey, which found that less-religious people in the 
U.S. support greater public spending for social programs—even if it means higher taxation—at 
higher rates than religious people. Meanwhile, religiously active people support private, 




attendance compiled by the World Values Survey to proxy for the “religiosity” of each country. 
Specifically, we compare the strength of the price incentive and the tax ratio to the percentage of 
the study sample answering the question, “How often do you attend religious services?” with 




citizens are not active religiously (Figure 5). Ireland, the country with the highest level of church 
attendance in the sample, employs a very high price incentive. But so does France, where church 
attendance is less than 10%. Similarly, Japan and Norway, where church attendance is less than 
 
39 See National Opinion Research Center, http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/projects/gensoc1.asp.  
40 Inglehart et al. (2004). See Question F028. 
  275%, offer a similar tax incentive as Italy, where church attendance exceeds 40%. In a simple 
regression on the level of price incentive, the coefficient on church attendance is 0.18 with a t-
score of 0.67.   
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Church attendance
coef = 0.18; se = 0.26; t = 0.67
 
Sources: World Values Survey 2004 and authors’ calculations. 
ighly religious countries do appear to collect lower taxes as a share of GDP (Figure 6). With 
 
H
the exception of Japan, countries where church attendance is lowest appear to be those where the 
tax ratio is largest. Conversely, countries with the highest church attendance, such as Ireland and 
the United States, have the smallest tax ratios. In a simple regression on the tax ratio, the 
coefficient on church attendance is –0.24 with a t-score of –2.35, which is significant at the 5% 
level.  
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Church attendance
coef = -0.24; se = 0.10; t = -2.35
 
Sources: World Values Survey 2004 and OECD (2004). 
 
(4)  Tax incentives and confidence in government 
 
We look finally at the relationship between tax policy and faith in government. Declining trust in 
government creates a demand for reducing the government’s role in society and replacing many 
of its functions with private firms and the nongovernmental sector (Nye 1997). States whose 
citizens have confidence in their government to make decisions in the best interest of society, 
meanwhile, are probably likely to accept the higher taxes that allow the state to deliver more 
services. The flipside, though, is that they may see less need for the government to encourage 
private citizens to take initiative in helping those in need. Such societies probably pay higher 
taxes, and are also less likely to place as high a premium on the need for private resources to help 
the poor, preferring public institutions to allocate resources. We again use data from the World 
Values Survey to explore the relationship between faith in government and the tax code. Our 
proxy for faith in government is the share of respondents expressing either “a great deal” or 
“quite a lot” of confidence in their national legislature.
41  
 
Confidence in the legislature appears to have an ambiguous relationship with the strength of 
charitable price incentives (Figure 7). In a simple regression on the level of price incentive, the 
coefficient on confidence in parliament is –0.07 with a t-score of –0.22. Citizens in Austria and 
Finland, two of only three countries without a price incentive, have nearly the same level of 
confidence in their parliaments as the French, who receive the strongest incentive for giving. 
Norway, whose citizens express the most confidence in their government, gives a similar price 
incentive as the three countries expressing the least faith in their governments: New Zealand, 
Japan and Greece. 
 
                                                 
41 Inglehart et al. (2004). See Question E075. 
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Confidence in parliament
coef = -0.07; se = 0.33; t = -0.22
 
Sources: World Values Survey 2004 and authors’ calculations. 
 
Societies where citizens have confidence in their governments, meanwhile, pay substantially 
higher taxes (Figure 8). In only three countries—Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden—do at 
least half of the population express confidence in the national legislature. Citizens of each pay a 
relatively high share of their income in taxes. In Australia, Ireland, and Japan, meanwhile, 
confidence in the legislature is less than 30% while tax revenue as a share of GDP is only a 
fraction of what it is in countries such as Sweden and Denmark. In a simple regression on tax 
ratio, the coefficient on confidence in parliament is 0.30 with a t-score of 2.41, which is 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Confidence in parliament
coef = 0.30; se = 0.12; t = 2.41
 
Sources: World Values Survey 2004 and OECD (2004). 
 
While the strength of price incentives appears to have a weak relationship with our tested 
societal characteristics, the observed relationship between the tax ratio and both religious 
participation and faith in government within a country appears strong, suggesting that where 
people place their faith might affect the development of tax policies. Societies that trust public 
institutions to provide social services and deliver public goods appear correspondingly more 
willing to pay higher taxes to maintain these relationships. Highly religious societies, on the 
other hand, also tend to be places where trust in the state has broken down. These countries place 
a greater emphasis on individual responsibility and have less faith in the central government to 
provide for social welfare. This prevailing view results in a more remote association with the 
central government and, consequently, a lower tax ratio. 
 
6.2.   Correlates of private international giving 
 
We next consider the relationship between observed giving outcomes and three variables that 
might influence individual decisions to give to developing countries: (1) tax policies; (2) national 
income; and (3) official foreign aid.  
 
(1)  Tax policies and private giving 
 
As described earlier, in theory, both types of tax incentives lead to more giving. To see if the 
relationship is strong and obvious, we first plot the strength of price incentives against log 
average annual private giving to developing countries per capita from 2000 to 2003 as measured 
by the DAC (Figure 9).
42 Higher price incentives do indeed appear associated with more private 
giving, though this relationship is not particularly strong. Countries with the highest price 
                                                 
42 Private giving is defined here, again, as the sum of donations to Part I and Part II countries in the most recent year 
with available data. OECD/DAC (2005a). 
  31incentives—including the Netherlands, Germany, Australia and Belgium—have some of the 
highest per capita giving rates while countries with the weakest charitable incentives place 
toward the bottom of the rankings. In a simple regression on log giving per capita, the coefficient 
on the level of price incentive is 2.94 with a t-score of 1.68, which is significant at the 10% level.  
 
In Section 5.1 we used an elasticity estimate of –0.5 to calculate the price effect of tax incentives. 
In order to compare our results with this estimate, we also regress log (1 – price incentive) on log 
average annual private giving per capita from 2000 to 2003. This regression results in a 
coefficient of –1.9 with a t-score of –2.06, which is significant at the 5% level. This suggests a 
price elasticity of –1.9, meaning that a 1% decrease in the price of a charitable gift leads to a 
2.1% increase in donations. This figure may be overstated, as it makes no attempt to control for 
other factors that affect charitable donations. Moreover, this result comes from a cross-country 
dataset while our earlier estimate derives from variation within the United States, and it is 
within-variation country that is more relevant for analyzing the impact of incentives on giving. 
But despite these differences, our result supports the existence of a price effect for charitable 
giving.  
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Price incentive
coef = 2.94; se = 1.75; t = 1.68
 
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a) and authors’ calculations. 
 
But a strong income effect resulting from low tax ratios does not emerge from these data. We 
next plot the tax ratio versus log average private giving per capita from 2000 to 2003 (Figure 10). 
While there is a slight downward trend, the relationship is not very significant. The United 
States, Ireland and Switzerland give among the most private aid and also have the smallest tax 
ratios. However, giving is high even in countries with high tax ratios. Many factors beyond 
income factor into individual decisions to give to charity but, according to these data, lower taxes 
do not appear to be a major influence on private donations. In a simple regression on log giving 
per capita, tax ratio has a coefficient of –2.88 and a t-score of –0.67. 
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Tax ratio
coef = -2.88; se = 4.32; t = -0.67
 
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a) and OECD (2004) 
 
(2)  Income and private giving 
 
Income may also be a determinant of the level of private charitable donations; people in 
wealthier countries likely give more than those in relatively poorer countries. We assess this 
relationship by plotting 2003 GNI per capita against average private giving to developing 
countries per capita from 2000 to 2003. As expected, richer countries give more private 
assistance to developing countries (Figure 11). In a simple regression on log private giving per 
capita, the coefficient on log income per capita is 5.92 with a t-score of 5.57, which is significant 
at the 1% level.  
 
This result represents an elasticity estimate of 5.92: a 1% increase in income leads to a 5.9% 
increase in private giving to developing countries. In Section 5.2 we used an income elasticity 
estimate of just 1.1, from the academic literature. The same caveats apply here as with our earlier 
price elasticity estimate. Our regression is a simple relationship between only two variables and 
makes no attempt to account for the influence of other factors that influence decisions to give to 
charity beyond only income. For example, there is no attempt to control for tax incentives, which 
appear mildly and positively correlated with income (Figure 1); controlling for them would 
lower the coefficient on income here. Our result is also derived from a cross-country comparison 
whereas the earlier estimate was for an individual country. But this result supports the existence 
of an income effect on private giving where higher income leads to more charity. 


























































9.8 10 10.2 10.4 10.6
Log income per capita
coef =5.92; se = 1.06; t = 5.57
 
Source: OECD/DAC (2005a); World Bank (2005) 
 
(3)  Public aid and private giving 
 
Finally, some argue that private assistance substitutes for foreign aid (Adelman 2003). Instead of 
relying on the government to allocate aid abroad, citizens make private decisions about the 
destination and use of their foreign assistance dollars. To examine this question, we plot the 
relationship between public net transfers per capita and average private giving per capita across 
our 21 DAC countries (Figure 12). 
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coef = 1.06; se = 0.32; t = 3.33
 
  34Source: OECD/DAC (2005a); Roodman (2005b). 
 
The data does not suggest that private charity serves as a substitute for public foreign aid. Indeed, 
private giving and public giving have a strong positive relationship. In a simple regression on log 
private giving per capita, the coefficient on log public net transfers per capita is 1.06 with a t-




Though private charity does not appear to be substituting for public foreign aid in most DAC 
countries, the size of private development assistance flowing from rich countries to poor 
countries is substantial. Rich country governments, meanwhile, can increase the level of charity 
donated by their citizens through modifications in national tax codes. While the full effect of 
government tax policy on private charity from rich countries to poor countries remains poorly 
understood, the amount of private assistance donated is at least partly an outcome of public 
policy.  
 
We find evidence suggesting the operation of both a price effect and an income effect on the 
amount of private development assistance from DAC countries. Nearly every DAC country uses 
its tax code to increase private charity. All but three countries in our survey currently offer some 
type of price incentive that reduces the cost of charitable gifts. Citizens in countries with stronger 
targeted income tax incentives appear to give more private charity to poor countries. And though 
evidence of an income effect resulting directly from lower average taxes is weak, we do find that 
richer countries overall also give more private charity. The strength of price incentives, 
meanwhile, appears to have a weak relationship with our tested societal characteristics, including 
income, population, religious participation and confidence in the legislature. But the observed 
relationship between the tax ratio and both church attendance and confidence in the legislature 
appears strong, suggesting that where people place their faith might affect the development of 
tax policies. Countries where confidence in the national legislature is high tend to have larger tax 
ratios while countries where religious participation is high tend to have smaller tax ratios. 
 
According to our rough estimates, tax incentives—which include both the strength of price 
incentives and the effect of lower taxes—increased private charitable giving from DAC countries 
to developing countries by some $7.5 billion in 2003, equivalent to 13% of total Net Aid 
Transfers from DAC countries. $5.3 billion of this additional assistance went to Part I countries, 
with most of the rest going to Israel. Private citizens respond to changes in the tax code in ways 
that lead to more private assistance for poor countries. Tax policy that favors private giving is, 
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  39Appendix 1. Sample copy of national tax policy survey 
 
 
SURVEY OF TAX INCENTIVES TO PROMOTE CHARITABLE GIVING 
 
Part I:  Income Tax Deductions 
1.  Does your country offer income tax deductions—a reduction in taxable income—for 
charitable giving?  If yes, what is a representative marginal tax rate for those who are 
likely responsible for the most giving? 
 
2.  Does your country offer income tax credits—a reduction in tax liability—for charitable 
giving?  If yes, what is the value of the credit? (Please list all credits available.) 
 
3.  Are there restrictions on which income tax payers qualify for tax incentives? (For 
example, in the United States, only people who itemize their deductions can claim 
charitable deductions.)  If yes, please estimate what percentage of the population qualifies 
for tax incentives. 
 
3.  Is there a maximum donation that is eligible for a tax incentive? This could be an 
absolute amount (such as the excess of donations over $2000 is not eligible) or a 
maximum percent of income (such as the excess of donations worth more than 10% of 
income is not eligible.)   
 
Part II:  Estate Tax 
1.  Does your country have an estate tax?  If yes, what is a representative marginal tax rate 
for those who are likely responsible for the most giving?   
 
2.  Does your country offer a tax deduction or tax credit for charitable bequests? 
If yes, what is the value? (Please list all available.) 
 
3.  Are there restrictions on which taxpayers qualify for tax incentives?  
If yes, please estimate what percentage of the population qualifies. 
 
4.  Is there a maximum bequest that is eligible for a tax incentive? This could be an absolute 
amount (such as the excess of bequests over $2000 is not eligible) or a maximum percent 




Part III:  Capital Gains Tax 
1.  Does your country have a capital gains tax separate from the income tax?  If yes, what is 
the representative tax rate? 
 
2.  Does your country offer a tax deduction for non-cash charitable contributions (such as 
appreciated securities)?  If yes, what is the value of the deduction?  
 
  403.  Is there a maximum non-cash contribution that is eligible for a tax incentive? This could 
be an absolute amount (such as the excess of donations of securities worth over $2000 is 
not eligible) or a maximum percent of income (such as the excess of donations of 
securities worth more than 10% of income is not eligible.) 
 
 
Part IV:  General Questions 
1.  Please provide any additional comments on tax incentives for charitable giving in your 
country that might not be captured by this questionnaire. 
   
2.  In general, what is the breakdown in charitable giving between various methods of 
donation? (For example, what proportion of total giving comes from living individual 
cash donations, charitable bequests, appreciated securities, etc.?) 
 
3.  Are there any datasets or additional information on giving patterns or tax incentives in 
your country? 
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